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American stratification as both open and egalitarian, appears in only one author (and somewhat ambiguously even for him) is also worthy of note.

The inadequacy of the theory is shown in two ways: first, in that the main effects, "height of stratification" and "economic basis of stratification," appeared to be ineffective to any great degree, and second, in its inability to deal satisfactorily with either Warner or Centers.

In spite of these weaknesses it is believed that the work has shown the utility of Q-methodology in testing theories which are essentially qualitative. Used in this way it seems promising as a systematic method for extending and improving present methods of comparative content analysis. The chief defect in this application of Q lies in the fact that it tests not only the original theory but also the individual analyst's particular interpretation of the works considered as the universe of the study. Quite obviously, bias on the part of the assignment of scores and the selection of the universe operate to restrict the validity and reliability of the findings. There is nothing in the method itself, however, which would prevent applying adequate tests of the usual type for both reliability and validity.

TRENDS IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: A CASE STUDY*

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INTRODUCTION

THE writings of American sociologists on social stratification may be divided into three categories: (1) theoretical formulations, (2) empirical research in either specific communities or the "mass society," and (3) speculations about stratification trends. There are basic differences between sociologists with respect to definitions and concepts, the criteria which determine stratification, and the amount of stratification in our society. In spite of differences, there is general agreement that American society is to a greater or lesser degree stratified. However, there is no consensus on the question of the trend of stratification in American society.

Several sociologists have asserted that American society has become more rigid in recent decades,[1] whereas others have claimed it is less rigid today than a half-century ago.[2] Those who believe that our status structure is becoming more rigid have relied upon such factors as the closing of the frontier, the slowing down of population growth, and an assumed maturing of the economy.

Proponents of the view that American society is less stratified today than at the beginning of the twentieth century rely upon a different set of facts and processes to justify their position. Sjoberg, for example, has argued recently that two world wars and a depression, along with expanding urbanization, increasing industrialization, unionization, the New Deal and the Fair Deal, mass communication, and inflation have altered fundamentally the structure of American society.[3]

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society held at Haverford College, April 5–6, 1952. Grateful acknowledgment is made hereby to the Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid; to the Committee on Bursary Appointments, Yale University; and the National Institute of Mental Health, United States Public Health Service for their support of various aspects of the research reported here.

[1] For example, see John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, *Social Life: Structure and Function,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949, p. 473; Walter Goldschmidt, "Social Class in America: A Critical Review," *American Anthropologist,* 52 (October-December, 1950), pp. 483–498; William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology,* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946, pp. 333–336; W. Lloyd Warner, Robert J. Havighurst, and Martin B. Loeb, *Who Shall Be Educated?,* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944, pp. 45–48.

[2] C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1951; Gideon Sjoberg, "Are Social Classes in America Becoming More Rigid?" *American Sociological Review,* 16 (December, 1951), pp. 775–783.

[3] Gideon Sjoberg, *op. cit.,* p. 776.

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The literature provides no clear-cut answer to this controversy because data that are available for the present are impossible to gather for the past. It was therefore decided to trace the historical development of the status structure of the New Haven community, and then present data that may be indicative of trends.

THE NEW HAVEN STATUS STRUCTURE

The status structure of contemporary New Haven can be understood only in the light of the cultural factors that have been brought to bear upon the community in the three centuries of its history. New Haven was founded in 1638 by a little band of devout English Puritans. It remained a small rural town until well into the nineteenth century. The community began to grow rapidly in the 1840's when the railroad to Boston and New York opened up new markets and sources of raw materials. Between 1840 and 1860, its population more than doubled and the value of its industries multiplied fourfold. From the Civil War to World War I, the curves of population and industrial growth swept upward in an increasing arc decade after decade.[4] Since 1920 the city has not grown but the suburban towns have continued to grow, though the rate has diminished each decade. Today metropolitan New Haven is a polyglot, but well-knit, manufacturing community of some 250,000 people.[5]

Ethnic Origin. Immigration and an expanding economic base were the keys to the community's rapid growth between 1840 and 1914. In 1840, New Haven's population of 12,960 was composed mainly of the descendants of the English Puritans who had settled in the area during the Colonial epoch. Starting about 1840, refugees from the potato famines of Ireland entered the city in increasing numbers year after year. In 1849, the first political refugees arrived as an aftermath of the revolution of 1848 in Germany. Irish and German immigration increased throughout the 1850's. During the Civil War immigration ceased, but as soon as it was over, the Irish and Germans came in greater numbers than before. In the late 1860's a number of Scandinavians settled in New Haven and West Haven. Russian and Polish Jews and Italians began to arrive in small numbers in the early 1880's. After 1890, their numbers increased yearly until the outbreak of World War I. Late in the 1890's Poles began to settle here in appreciable numbers.

The immigrants that came in the last half of the nineteenth century provided the basis, in the main, for the present population and the status structure. A careful study of the ethnic origins of the population as of 1940 revealed the following distribution: Italians, 33 per cent; Irish, 23 per cent; Russian, Polish and Austrian Jews, 16 per cent; British-Americans, 13 per cent; Germans, 6 per cent; Poles, 4 per cent; Scandinavians, 2 per cent; and Negroes, 3 per cent.[6] Although all of these groups have been in the community for at least a half century, they are keenly aware that their ancestors were English, Irish, Italian, Russian, German, Polish, or Negro. A symbol of this is the identification of individuals and groups as Irish-American; Italian-American, and so on. This tendency to hyphenate various nationality origins is growing in political circles where both major parties bid for the votes of individuals by appealing to nationality backgrounds. In short, ethnic origin is a prime factor in the determination of status.

Occupational Status. Occupational pursuit is a second salient factor in the determination of social position. From the community's founding to the present, occupation has been linked directly to status. In the colonial period this linkage was official and direct.[7] Since the close of the colonial era, the relationship between status and occupation has continued to be direct, but unofficial.

[4] For a statistical analysis of the community's growth from 1850 to 1910, see Cass Gilbert and Frederick L. Olmsted, *New Haven,* Report of the Civic Improvement Commission, New Haven, 1910.

[5] The following places by size are included in the community: New Haven, 164,443; West Haven, 32,010; East Haven, 12,212; Hamden, 29,715; North Haven, 9,444; and Woodbridge, 2,822. All population figures are for 1950.

[6] Ruby J. R. Kennedy, "Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870–1940," *American Journal of Sociology,* 39 (January, 1944), pp. 331–339.

[7] M. H. Mitchell, *History of New Haven Colony,* Chicago, 1930, Vol. I, pp. 24, 32–33, 41, 91; E. E. Atwater, *The History of the City of New Haven,* New York, 1887, pp. 530–532.

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The influx of immigration in the nineteenth century gave rise to a second factor in the nexus of occupation and status. This was the tendency for particular occupations to be associated with particular ethnic groups. The association of ethnic groups with occupational positions began with the influx of Irish in the 1840's. The Irish were welcomed in the newly founded factories as "unskilled hands"; and they were hired on the railroad as laborers. When the Germans came, they proved to be an exception, in part, to the custom for immigrants to start at the bottom, because some of them were well-to-do merchants, manufacturers, and artisans who left Europe for political reasons. Refugees who brought their wealth with them soon established businesses and sent back to Germany for workmen. Thus from the beginning the Germans were divided into owning and working strata. Many of the Scandinavians who came in the late 1860's and 1870's were craftsmen. They engaged immediately in cabinet making, boatbuilding, carriage making and carpentry. The vast majority of the other immigrant groups started their American work experience in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. As each new immigrant group entered the occupational system, the members of earlier ones, who had adjusted successfully to the new society, moved up a notch. Thus different ethnic groups, and individual members of ethnic groups, occupied different positions in the economic system when large scale immigration was stopped by World War I.

This point has been demonstrated by the detailed studies of assimilation and stratification in New Haven that McConnell and Myers have made in the past fifteen years. McConnell in 1936 studied the relationship of ethnic origin to economic stratification.[8] He analyzed the nationality backgrounds and occupations of 1,633 heads of households selected at random in the community. He found that approximately two-thirds of the British-American heads of households were in non-manual occupational pursuits, and exactly two-thirds of the Italians and Poles were in manual occupations. What was more striking was his finding that 64 per cent of the professionals and business executives were British-Americans, and less than 4 per cent of these groups were individuals of Italian or Polish origin. The Irish were concentrated in public service jobs and white-collar clerical work. The Russian Jews showed a marked tendency to be retail proprietors. The Germans spread from the highest executive positions to the skilled crafts, with very few in the semi-skilled and unskilled categories.

Myers in 1948 made an exhaustive study of the assimilation of Italians in the community.[9] His findings support those of McConnell. In brief, Myers found that a very small percentage of Italians are moving into the highest occupations; the vast majority are still manual workers. These studies reveal that the differences in the time each ethnic group has been in the community, coupled with the way it was regarded by the "Old Yankee" elite, set the stage for the current system of stratification.

The Yankee Core Group. The "Old Yankees", although a small percentage of the population by 1900, looked upon the community as a structure they had fashioned out of a wilderness through their own relentless efforts. This proud, uncompromising minority looked down upon the immigrant groups. Few "Yankees" were willing to accept immigrants socially. They believed sincerely in a way of life that included Protestantism, profits, privileges, and pride in an English origin. The "Old Yankees" possessed the culture the immigrants had to acquire before they could become "Americans" in the eyes not only of the Yankees but of their children and of themselves. This elite set the tone for the immigrants who aspire to realize traditional American ideals of success and the equality of person and position. It controlled the city of New Haven and the suburban towns politically, financially, industrially, professionally, and socially.[10]

Social distance between the "Old Yankees" and the immigrant groups was heightened by

[8] John W. McConnell, *The Influence of Occupation Upon Social Stratification,* Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, 1937.

[9] Jerome K. Myers, Jr., *The Differential Time Factor in Assimilation: A Study of Aspect and Processes of Assimilation among the Italians of New Haven,* Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, 1949.

[10] Cass Gilbert and Frederick L. Olmsted, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.

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the fact that the immigrants were, on the whole, non-Protestant. Moreover, they first settled in rundown congested sections of the city. There they established churches and other institutions that tended to bind each ethnic group into a cultural enclave that was patterned as nearly as circumstances permitted after the society of its homeland. In addition, each ethnic group held itself apart from the others. Thus the community was separated into a series of almost self-contained subcultures and subsocieties.

In spite of isolating factors, the immigrants were brought under the influences of the dominant American cultural system through the job and the school. As the process of assimilation took its course, members of ethnic groups acquired generalized and officially professed American beliefs in the equality of man and the equality of opportunity. They also acquired an intimate personal knowledge of the inequalities associated with being a member of an out-group. As they made efforts to become equals in a society of equals, they were rebuffed by the "Old Yankees." The effects of these factors on the social structure of the community will be touched upon later in the analysis.

ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS

It was stated above that an assay of trends is difficult because data are not in existence to enable the construction of a satisfactory profile of what the stratification system was during a base period and then to measure another period against the base. There are, however, data on: (1) changes in the occupational structure between 1910 and 1940, (2) the present status structure, and (3) who is marrying whom. From these data it is possible to draw some conclusions about stratification in the community in recent years.

Changes in the Occupational Structure. A comparison of the occupational structure of the community during two different periods will provide the foundation for some deductions relative to opportunities for mobility. If the occupational structure is expanding toward the higher status occupations there should be excellent opportunities for individual upward mobility. But if the occupational structure is not expanding, particularly in the upper reaches, upward mobility will be restricted to a very small percentage of the population. Those who have attained higher positions in a past generation tend generally to train their descendants to occupy these or similar positions. This leaves only the surplus positions for parvenus from the lower ranks.

With these ideas in mind, let us turn to the discussion of socio-economic data taken from the United States Censuses for 1910 and 1940, to see what has been happening to the New Haven occupational structure during the present century.

TABLE I. PER CENT GAINFULLY OCCUPIED INDIVIDUALS BY SEX AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP IN THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN FOR 1910,* AND THE NEW HAVEN COMMUNITY IN 1940†

Socio-Economic Group	Males		Females	
	1910	1940	1910	1940
Professionals	4.3	6.0	7.7	12.5
Proprietors, Officials	11.6	11.6	5.3	2.6
Semi-Professionals	.4	1.4	.8	.9
Clerical and Sales Workers	13.4	17.3	19.4	31.1
Craftsmen, Foremen	24.5	22.7	7.5	1.3
Operatives	22.4	23.4	25.1	30.2
Service Workers	1.7	8.0	....	8.0
Domestics	5.5	.4	27.2	12.0
Unskilled Laborers	16.2	9.2	7.0	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Occupational data were published in 1910 for the City of New Haven only. The city comprised 86 per cent of the population at that time; the non-New Haven population in the community in 1910 was largely rural farm.

† Based on the figures given in *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Population, Occupation, Statistics,* Volume IV, Table 3, 166–179; these figures were reclassified by the use of Alba M. Edwards, *Classified Index of Occupations, Sixteenth Census of the U. S.* 1940; and Alba M. Edwards, *Alphabetical Index of Occupations and Industries, Sixteenth Census of the U. S.,* 1940, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, 1940; *Sixteenth Census of the U. S.,* 1940, Population, Vol. II, Part I, *Characteristics of the Population,* Tables 33, 51, and 74, Washington, 1943.

Study of Table I shows that between 1910 and 1940, male professionals in the New Haven community increased by 1.7 per 100 gainfully employed workers. Table I does not reveal a very important fact about what

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has been happening in the professions, namely, that the increase shown was not divided equally between free professionals and salaried professionals. Actually the number of free professionals increased only 33 per cent, although the community's population increased by 48 per cent. This means that the number of doctors, lawyers, consulting engineers, architects and the like, increased only about two-thirds as fast as the general population. On the other hand the number of male salaried professionals increased by 93 per cent, almost twice as fast as the population of the community. This increase is accounted for almost wholly by the growth of the faculty of Yale University. This faculty, however, has been drawn from over the nation, rather than from the community. Therefore this growth is not a true reflection of communal growth. The proportion of proprietors, managers, and officials was the same in 1940 as in 1910—11.6 per cent of all gainfully employed males. The semi-professional group increased by one per hundred. There was a net gain of four per hundred in the clerical and sales group.

The skilled trades experienced a decline of 1.8 workers per hundred, while the operatives, mainly line workers in factories, increased by one per 100. The shift out of domestic service was one of the remarkable changes in the male occupational structure. Male domestics dropped from 5.5 per hundred in 1910 to 0.4 per hundred in 1940. Service workers, on the other hand, increased from less than two per 100 to eight per 100. Although we have no direct evidence as to where the domestic workers went, it may be no coincidence that there has been a corresponding increase in the percentage of service workers. On the surface it appears that the type of men who were domestics in 1910 have simply moved into other types of service work in more recent years. If this is the case there has been little net gain statuswise, for the bulk of service workers, whether domestic or otherwise, rank low in the hierarchy of occupational prestige. Finally, there was a sharp decline in the proportion of unskilled laborers—the actual loss was 7 per 100.

A comparison of the male and female sides of Table I will show that the distribution of gainfully employed females in the occupational structure was different from that for males in both 1910 and 1940, but the trends in this period are the same. The greatest changes were the sharp increases in the number of women employed as professionals, clerks and sales people, service workers and operatives. These increases were balanced by declines in the other major categories: domestics, skilled, and unskilled workers.

The proportion of gainfully employed males and females engaged in the non-skilled occupations declined sharply between 1910 and 1940. In 1910, almost one-fourth of the males and one-third of the females were working in the non-skilled jobs categorized under domestic service and unskilled labor. In 1940, the ratio had dropped to less than one male out of ten, and one female out of eight. Clearly a basic trend has been the shift out of non-skilled jobs.

TABLE II. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF GAINFULLY OCCUPIED INDIVIDUALS BY SEX, COMBINED INTO STATUS GROUPS IN THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN IN 1910, AND THE NEW HAVEN COMMUNITY IN 1940

	Males		Females	
Status Group	1910	1940	1910	1940
High	15.9	17.6	13.0	15.1
Medium	38.3	41.4	27.7	33.3
Low	45.8	41.0	59.3	51.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

A sharper profile of changes in the occupational structure emerges when the nine socio-economic groups of Table I are combined into the *High, Middle,* and *Low Status* categories of Table II. The *High Status* category includes the professionals, proprietors, and officials. The *Middle Status* group encompasses the semi-professionals, clerical and sales, and the skilled crafts. The *Low Status* category covers the operatives, domestic and service workers and laborers. In the thirty-year interval under study, the high status category increased by 1.7 male workers per 100, the middle status group by 3.1 workers per 100, and the low status group showed a net decline of 4.8 workers per 100. These figures show that between 1910 and 1940 there was only a slight increase in the proportion of male workers in the higher prestige occupations, and that there was an

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actual decline in the bottom group, and some expansion in the middle group. Viewed broadly there was remarkable stability in the male occupational structure.

The status profile for females is very similar to that for males. The *High Status* occupations experienced a net gain of 2.3 workers per hundred. Salaried female professionals experienced the greatest proportionate growth of any group in the occupational structure. This increase was composed in large part of low paid, salaried community professionals—school teachers, nurses, social workers and librarians. The *Middle Status* occupations increased by 5.6 workers per 100. The *Low Status* group declined by 7.8 workers per 100. This decrease was offset, of course, by the gains in the two higher groups.

When the changes in the proportion of male and female workers in each of the three status groups are compared, it is clear that many more opportunities have opened in the higher occupational positions in recent years for women than for men. These positions are, on the whole, low paid. They are filled largely by single women who have been specially trained, sometimes for several years. If these women stay in the labor force they tend to remain single, but if they marry, they generally leave their positions. This provides vacancies for other single, trained women. There is a much lower rate of turnover among trained men who attain professional or executive positions. This means that there are far fewer opportunities for males in the higher prestige groups than for females, both on the basis of the number of new openings that have developed in the period since World War I, and the number of vacancies in a particular occupation.

The significance of this generalization becomes apparent when we analyze trends within manufacturing industries. In 1910, 50 per cent of all gainfully employed workers were engaged in industry; by 1940, this percentage had declined to 40. However, this was still the largest single type of employment. Within the various industries, certain changes occurred that are pertinent to this discussion. In the first place, large corporations bought up small family-owned industries and corporations—this resulted in a 53 per cent decline in the number of proprietors. In the second place, when large corporations bought out small ones, they replaced or retired most of the officers of the old corporation. In this process there was a pruning off of officers. The result was a 41 per cent decline in the number of salaried officials of corporations between 1910 and 1940, and there was a real decrease in the number of officers per plant. In 1910, there were 3.2 officers to each incorporated manufacturing plant, and the number had declined to 1.2 per plant by 1940. In the third place, there was a decrease in the ratio of salaried officials of corporations to clerical and wage employees. In 1910, there was one officer to every 33 employees; in 1940, there was one officer to 50 employees. However, the officers were paid three times as much in 1940 as in 1910 and the mean incomes of the clerical and wage workers doubled in the same period.[11]

As the large corporations reduced their officer personnel they enlarged the clerical force; there was an increase of 37 per cent in the number of male clerical workers, in the face of a decrease of 20 per cent in the proportion of the community's population that was gainfully employed in industry between 1910 and 1940. Possibly many a clerk in 1940 was doing the work of an officer of 1910. This process of downgrading officers to clericals was more economical from the viewpoint of the cost accountant, but it shrank "room at the top" by at least one-half, limiting the potential upward mobility of many men. Simultaneously, however, it did allow for a considerable expansion in the white-collar supervisory positions at a relatively lower salary. The men who filled the clerical positions represented by the net gain of 37 per cent could look down upon the wage workers, because they had achieved the right to wear street clothes at work, and because they earned on the average 40 per cent more than the wage workers.

We may conclude from occupational data two things about this dimension of the status

[11] The mean income of officers of corporations was $2,272; clerical employees averaged $893, and wage employees $543 in 1909; in 1939, the average for each group was: officers, $6,893, clericals, $1,777, wage earners, $1,064, Thirteenth Census of the U. S., 1910, Vol. IX, *Manufactures,* pp. 162–163; Sixteenth Census of the U. S., 1940, Vol. III, *Manufactures,* p. 166.

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structure: *First,* the occupational structure of the New Haven Community has been remarkably stable since before World War I; *Second,* the middle status occupations support a larger proportion of the population than they did two generations ago. This enlargement of the middle rank occupations has been accompanied by an actual decline in the lower rank occupations. The higher status occupations, except for salaried professionals, support a proportionately smaller number of workers than forty years ago.

Since higher class people are supported usually by high status occupations, it seems legitimate to infer from these trends that movement into the higher positions in the status system is more difficult today than it was before World War I. On the other hand, more opportunities are open today in the middle range occupations than in the early years of this century. It appears safe to assume that most of the men and women who fill these middle range positions today have been upward mobile in the course of their careers. Our data indicate, however, that unless the higher status positions expand in the next generation, the children of those who have moved into these middle rank jobs will be stabilized, for the most part, within a relatively narrow occupational and status range. Further upward mobility appears to be limited to the able and lucky few who may fill the positions left vacant by the failure of the present generation of high status families to produce and train enough replacements for the highest positions in the status system which they now hold.

While the emphasis here has been on the higher and middle status positions, we must not forget that 41 per cent of the males, and almost 52 per cent of the females are engaged in low status occupations. Data the writer has accumulated by 1,500 personal interviews on the education and occupations of fathers and sons show that the lower the educational and occupational level of the father the greater the probabality that the son will have a meager education and will follow a low ranking occupation. Conversely, the higher the position of the father the greater the probability that the son will be trained for a high status occupation. Thus we infer that the probabilities are high that there will be little mobility out of the lower status positions into the middle ones unless the middle status occupations expand far more rapidly than they have during the last two generations. Before these lower status people can move into the middle status positions, under present circumstances, one of two things must occur. Either they must acquire more education and skills than they now possess or the qualifications for the middle status occupations must be lowered drastically. The writer has no evidence to indicate that either one of these things is likely to happen in this community in the foreseeable future. In short there will be a bottom and many people will be near it, if not actually on it.

The Development of Parallel Structures. A second body of relevant data is the material Dr. Jerome K. Myers and the writer have assembled on the social structure of the New Haven community during the last five years. They have recently completed interviews on a 5 per cent random sample of families. The data indicate that the community's current social structure is differentiated *vertically* along racial, ethnic, and religious lines, and each of these vertical cleavages, in turn, is differentiated horizontally by a series of strata or classes that are encompassed within it. Around the sociobiological axis of race two social worlds have evolved—a Negro world and a white world. The white world is divided by ethnic origin and religion into Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish contingents. Within these divisions there are numerous ethnic schisms. The Irish hold aloof from the Italians, and the Italians move in different circles from the Poles. The Jews maintain a religious and social life separate from the Gentiles. The horizontal strata that transect each of these vertical structures are based upon the social values that are attached to occupation, education, place of residence in the community, and associations. Thus ethnic origin, occupation, education, and residence are combined into a complicated status system.

The vertically differentiating factors of race, religion, and ethnic origin, when combined with the horizontally differentiating ones of occupation, education, place of residence and so on, produce a social structure that is highly compartmentalized. The integrating factors in this complex are twofold. First, each stratum of each vertical division is similar in its cultural characteristics to

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the corresponding stratum in the other divisions. Second, the cultural pattern for each stratum or class was set by the "Old Yankee" core group. The "Old Yankee" provided the master cultural mold that has shaped the class system of each racial, religious and ethnic group. In short, a major trend in the social structure of the New Haven community during the last half-century has been the development of *parallel class structures* within the limits of race, ethnic origin, and religion.

This development may be illustrated by the fact that there are seven different Junior Leagues in the white segment of the community for appropriately affiliated upper class young women. The top ranking organization is the New Haven Junior League which draws its membership from "Old Yankee" Protestant families whose daughters have been educated in private schools. The Catholic Charity League is next in rank and age—its membership is drawn from Irish-American families. In addition to this organization there are Italian and Polish Junior Leagues within the Catholic division of the society. The Swedish and Danish Junior Leagues are for properly connected young women in these ethnic groups, but they are Protestant. Then too, the upper class Jewish families have their Junior League. The Negroes have a Junior League for their top-drawer young women. This principle of parallel structures for a given class level, by religious, ethnic and racial groups, proliferates throughout the community.[12]

The impact of this structure on the lives of individuals may be assessed, in some measure, by who is marrying whom.[13] We have interviewed a 50 per cent random sample of couples who were married in New Haven during 1948, 1949, and 1950. All couples were stratified by the use of an Index of Social Position[14] into classes or strata. When the data were analyzed in the light of the concept of parallel social structures it was found (1) that 91 per cent of all white marriages were within the same religious group, and (2) that 93 per cent were within the same social level. These figures show that the community is tightly compartmentalized vertically by race and religion, and horizontally by status, class, or social level.

CONCLUSIONS

The assessment of trends in the status structure of American society is a difficult undertaking because data on stratification for the society as a whole are non-existent. Sociologists who have drawn conclusions about trends in the society as a whole have done so on shaky grounds. Their generalizations have been based on data from a few small communities. Before we can draw definitive conclusions about the trend of stratification in the "mass society" we need better and more appropriate data than have been utilized to date.

In the New Haven community the data demonstrate that during the past two generations highly stratified parallel social structures have evolved that compartmentalize the social life of its inhabitants. On the basis of these data, it is inferred that this compartmentalization is becoming more rigid with the passage of time. The rigidity in the status structure is reinforced by: (a) the tight occupational structure and (b) the association of ethnic origin with occupational pursuits. This structure is bulwarked further by the organization of the community's religious, educational, marital, and leisure-time institutions.

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[12] For an exhaustive analysis of this principle as it applies to women's organizations, see Mhyra S. Minnis, *The Relationship of Women's Organizations to the Social Structure of a City,* Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, Sterling Memorial Library, 1951.

[13] For a statement of methodological procedures and some findings of this study, see August B. Hollingshead, "Cultural Factors in the Selection of Marriage Mates," *American Sociological Review,* 15 (October, 1950), pp. 619–627; August B. Hollingshead, "Age Relationships and Marriage," *American Sociological Review,* 16 (August, 1951) pp. 492–499.

[14] This index relies upon the scaling of occupation, education, and residence, and the assignment of weights to place families or individuals in the status structure. Its construction and validation will be described in a forthcoming monograph by the present author.

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